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277 U.S. 183
No. 509.
Argued April 19, 1928.
Decided May 14, 1928.
183 Messrs. Judson Hannigan and John E. Hannigan, both of Boston,
Mass., for plaintiff in error.
Messrs.
Peter J. Nelligan and Joseph P. Lyons, both of Boston, Mass., for
defendants in error.
185
Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.
A
zoning ordinance of the city of Cambridge divides the city into three
kinds of districts, residential, business, and unrestricted. Each of these
districts is subclassified in respect of the kind of buildings which way
be erected. The ordinance is
an elaborate one, and of the same general character as that considered by
this court in Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L.
Ed. 303. In its general scope it is conceded to be constitutional
within that decision. The
land of plaintiff in error was put in district R-3, in which are permitted
only dwellings, hotels, clubs, churches, schools, philanthropic
institutions, greenhouses and gardening, with customary incidental
accessories. The attack upon
the ordinance is that, as specifically applied to plaintiff in error, it
deprived him of his property without due process of law in contravention
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
186
The suit was for a mandatory injunction directing the city and its
inspector of buildings to pass upon an application of the plaintiff in
error for a permit to erect any lawful buildings upon a tract of land
without regard to the provisions of the ordinance including such tract
within a residential district. The
case was referred to a master to make and report findings of fact.
After a view of the premises and the surrounding territory, and a
hearing, the master made and reported his findings. The case came on to be heard by a justice of the court, who,
after confirming the master's report, reported the case for the
determination of the full court. Upon
consideration, that court sustained the ordinance as applied to plaintiff
in error, and dismissed the bill. 157
N. E. 618.
A
condensed statement of facts, taken from the master's report, is all that
is necessary. When the zoning
ordinance was enacted, plaintiff in error was and still is the owner of a
tract of land containing 140,000 square feet, of which the locus here in
question is a part. The locus
contains about 29,000 square feet, with a frontage on Brookline street,
lying west, of 304.75 feet, on Henry street, lying north, of 100 feet, on
the other land of the plaintiff in error, lying east, of 264 feet, and on
land of the Ford Motor Company, lying southerly, of 75 feet.
The territory lying east and south is unrestricted. The lands
beyond Henry street to the north and beyond Brookline
street to the west are within a restricted residential district.
The effect of the zoning is to separate from the west end of
plaintiff in error's tract a strip 100 feet in width.
The Ford Motor Company has a large auto assembling factory south of
the locus; and a soap factory and the tracks of the Boston & Albany
Railroad lie near. Opposite
the locus, on Brookline street, and included in the same district, there
are some residences; and opposite the locus, on Henry street, and in the
same district, are other residences.
The locus is now vacant, 187 although it was once occupied by a mansion house.
Before the passage of the ordinance in question, plaintiff in error
had outstanding a contract for the sale of the greater part of his entire
tract of land for the sum of $63,000.
Because of the zoning restrictions, the purchaser refused to comply
with the contract. Under the
ordinance, business and industry of all sorts are excluded from the locus,
while the remainder of the tract is unrestricted.
It further appears that provision has been made for widening
Brookline street, the effect of which, if carried out, will be to reduce
the depth of the locus to 65 feet. After a statement at length of further facts, the master
finds:
'That no practical
use can be made of the land in question for residential purposes, because
among other reasons herein related, there would not be adequate return on
the amount of any investment for the development of the property.'
The last finding of the master is:
'I
am satisfied that the districting of the plaintiff's land in a residence
district would not promote the health, safety, convenience, and general
welfare of the inhabitants of that part of the defendant city, taking into
account the natural development thereof and he character of the district
and the resulting benefit to accrue to the whole city and I so find.'
It
is made pretty clear that because of the industrial and railroad purposes
to which the immediately adjoining lands to the south and east have been
devoted and for which they are zoned, the locus is of comparatively little
value for the limited uses permitted by the ordinance.
[1]
We quite agree with the opinion expressed below that a court should not
set aside the determination of public officers in such a matter unless it
is clear that their action 'has no foundation in reason and is a mere
arbitrary or irrational exercise of power having no substantial relation
to the public health, the public morals, the public
188 safety or the public welfare in its proper sense.'
Euclid v. Ambler Co., supra, p. 395 (47 S. Ct. 121).
[2][3]
An inspection of a plat of the city upon which the zoning districts are
outlined, taken in connection with the master's findings, shows with
reasonable certainty that the inclusion of the locus in question is not
indispensable to the general plan. The
boundary line of the residential district before reaching the locus runs
for some distance along the streets, and to exclude the locus from the
residential district requires only that such line shall be continued 100
feet further along Henry street and thence south along Brookline street.
There does not appear to be any reason why this should not be done. Nevertheless, if that were all, we should not be warranted in
substituting our judgment for that of the zoning authorities primarily
charged with the duty and responsibility of determining the question.
Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U. S. 325, 328, 47 S. Ct. 594,
71 L. Ed. 1074, and cases cited. But
that is not all. The
governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations with the general
rights of the land owner by restricting the character of his use, is not
unlimited, and, other questions aside, such restriction cannot be imposed
if it does not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare. Euclid v. Ambler Co., supra, p. 395 (47 S. Ct. 114).
Here, the express finding of the master, already quoted, confirmed
by the court below, is that the health, safety, convenience, and general
welfare of the inhabitants of the part of the city affected will not be
promoted by the disposition made by the ordinance of the locus in
question. This finding of the
master, after a hearing and an inspection of the entire area affected,
supported, as we think it is, by other findings of fact, is determinative
of the case. That the
invasion of the property of plaintiff in error was serious and highly
injurious is clearly established; and, since a necessary
189 basis for the support of that invasion is wanting, the action of
the zoning authorities comes within the ban of the Fourteenth Amendment
and cannot be sustained.
Judgment
reversed.
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