SIX LESSONS FOR MUNICIPAL LAWYERS:
CITY OF MONTEREY V. DEL MONTE DUNES AT MONTEREY, LTD.
continued from previous page

The Court ruled that a suit under § 1983 that seeks legal relief is an action at law that entitles the claimant to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment when brought in federal court. Because Del Monte Dunes' suit proceeded in federal court under § 1983 and sought legal (as opposed to equitable) relief in the form of monetary damages, the Court concluded that it was entitled to a jury trial.

The Court's jury trial holding, perhaps seemingly broad at first glance, is limited in several important respects. First, it does not apply to takings actions against the United States. Second, it does not apply to takings suits brought in state court. Third, it does not apply to suits for injunctive relief. The Court expressly reaffirmed "tha t the Seventh Amendment does not apply in these contexts." Id. at 1643.

The limitation of the ruling to regulatory takings cases brought in federal court is especially significant for municipalities because under Williamson County, takings claimants must seek relief in state court before filing a regulatory takings claim in federal court. Del Monte Dunes was permitted to proceed in federal court first because at the time it filed suit, California state courts did not award monetary relief in temporary taking suits. Since the Court's landmark ruling in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987), however, virtually all states now provide such relief in inverse condemnation cases, and takings claimants are obliged to pursue those remedies. Because a takings claimant typically will receive a full and fair opportunity to litigate its takings claim in state court, the "Full Faith and Credit Act" (28 U.S.C. § 1738) often will preclude the claimant from relitigating the same issues in federal court. E.g. Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 298 (1998). In the post-First English world, the jury trial ruling in Del Monte Dunes might well have little effect because takings claimants often will be precluded from getting a "second bite at the apple" in federal court.

The unique procedural posture in Del Monte Dunes offers another significant limitation on its jury trial ruling. The Court twice tied its jury trial ruling to the absence of any compensation remedy in California courts prior to First English. In a portion of the opinion joined by all five Justices in the Majority, the Court emphasized: [Del Monte Dunes] was entitled to proceed in federal court under § 1983 because, at the time of the city's actions, the State of California did not provide a compensatory remedy for temporary regulatory takings. See First English, 482 U.S. at 308-311. The constitutional injury alleged, therefore, is not that property was taken but that it was taken without just compensation. Had the city paid for the property or had an inadequate postdeprivation remedy been available, Del Monte Dunes would have suffered no constitutional injury from the taking alone. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194-195. [Id. at 1638-39.]

The Majority again returned to this unique procedural posture at the end of its opinion, stressing that its ruling does "not address the jury's role in an ordinary inverse condemnation suit," and that "[e]ven the State of California, where this suit arose, now provides a facially adequate procedure for obtaining just compensation for temporary takings such as this one." Id. at 1644.

Some members of the plaintiffs' bar have suggested that Del Monte Dunes will compel certain state courts to read their state Constitutions in a similar fashion and find a jury trial right for regulatory takings claims filed in state court. This argument is based primarily on a portion of the opinion that suggests that regulatory takings claims are analogous to torts against property that were tried by juries when the Seventh Amendment was ratified. Id. at 1639-42. This discussion came in response to contentions by the city and the dissent that regulatory takings claims are analogous to eminent domain proceedings, and that because the latter carry no jury trial right, neither should the former. Id. at 1639. Municipal attorneys have at least two responses. First, this discussion does not represent a binding ruling of the Court, but only the plurality views of four Justices (Kennedy, the Chief, Stevens, and Thomas) because Justice Scalia declined to join it. Second, the plurality again tied this analysis to the unique, pre-First English posture of the case, stressing that "Del Monte Dunes was denied not only its property but also just compensation or even an adequate forum for seeking it." Id. at 1641. Municipalities thus should argue that the plurality's analogy to common-law tort actions is inapplicable where state law provides a compensation remedy for regulatory takings, as is the case in virtually all cases.

In one of the first extended discussions of Del Monte Dunes' jury ruling by a federal appeals court, the Ninth Circuit rejected a claimant's argument that it was entitled to a jury trial. In Buckles v. King County, 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 21612 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 1999), the appeals court unanimously upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment to King County in a takings and due process challenge to a zoning decision under the Washington Growth Management Act of 1990. The claimants argued that the county's zoning of their 10-acre property for residential use failed to advance a legitimate county interest and demanded a jury trial on the issue. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the facts and procedural posture in Del Monte Dunes were "extreme" and inapposite. Slip op. at 37. Although the Ninth Circuit had "some difficulty parsing the distinctions laid out by the Supreme Court concerning when a jury trial is required," it noted that the Supreme Court "caution[ed] that the unusual 'posture of the case' counsels against a rule for all time." Id. at 36-37. Moreover, "Del Monte Dunes did not even alter or consider the traditional summary judgment standards." Id. at 38. Because there were no genuine issues of material fact, summary judgment was appropriate. Because the property was zoned for residential use when the claimants bought it, and for other reasons, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the county. Id. at 39-42. The ruling confirms initial reactions by most observers that Del Monte Dunes' jury trial ruling is narrow.

If you have questions or comments about this website or
Community Rights Counsel email us!

© 2005 Community Rights Counsel. All rights reserved.