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U. S. SUPREME COURT Cert. Petitions Denied in Significant Regulatory Takings Cases

44 Cases Listed
Updated: March 4, 2002


Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. Local Joint Executive Board of La Vegas, et al., S. Ct. No. 01-918
Petition Filed: Dec. 21, 2002
Lower Court Opinion: 257 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2001)

Although the Petition raises a First Amendment issue, this case raises issues regarding property rights, including the right to exclude.  Pacific Legal Foundation has filed an amicus brief in support of the petition.  The Petitioner argues that the effect of the appeal court's ruling is to convert private property into public property without compensation.

Question presented:

1. Whether, as the divided Ninth Circuit held below, a wholly private entity is constrained by the First Amendment when controlling protests on its own private sidewalk on the basis that the sidewalk -- although private property -- resembles a "public forum" in certain respects, or whether, as other federal and state courts have held  and as this Court's decisions instruct, a private entity's control of expressive activity on its own property can be deemed state action subject to the First Amendment only in exceptionally narrow circumstances involving the equivalent of a "company town."

 

Phillip D. Forner, F&B Development, L.L.C. and Allendale Heating Co., Inc. v. Allendale Charter Township, S. Ct. No. 01-951
Petition Filed: Oct. 29, 2001
Lower Court Opinion: 627 N.W. 2d 596 (Mich. 2001)
Question Presented:

1. The ZBA's variance included, among other conditions, a 7.55-acre open space that must continue until one year after the adjacent turkey farm ceased operating as an intensive animal operation.  Did the ZBA or the continued agricultural zoning result in a taking of some (7.55 acres) or all of petitioners' land without compensation?


Darwin R. Griffith v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
, S. Ct. No. 01-853
Petition Filed: Dec. 5, 2001
Cert. Denied: Feb. 25, 2002
Lower Court Opinion: 340 N.J.Super. 596, 775 A.2d 54 (May 2001)
Questions Presented:

1. Whether the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) require this Court to provide just compensation for a temporary taking of real property, in the context of unreasonable and extraordinary administrative delays in the developmental approval process, which occur prior to a governmental entity's exercise of state statutory provisions enabling that entity to ameliorate a landowner's damaged by modifying its conduct and thereby avoid a permanent takings?

2. Whether the lower court erred in finding that:

A. The time consumed by the judicial review of a state agency decisions, which contributes to an overall extraordinary delay, prior to the ultimate reversal of an irrational agency decision denying development approvals, is inherently part of a reasonable administrative approval process, and therefore, not compensable in a temporary takings claim brought pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution?

B. A permit applicant is require to exhaust all available administrative processes prior to instituting a judicial action for a temporary takings where (1) the responsible state agency has rendered a final decision relative to a specifically require permit, that effectively extinguishes all feasible economic development on the applicant's property, and where (2) the simultaneous or sequential pursuit of additional development permits by the applicant would not clarify or broaden the scope of the property's development potential?

 

Rowe v. North Carolina Dept. of Transp., S. Ct. No. 01-819 
Petition Filed: Nov. 14, 2001 
Cert. Denied: Feb. 19, 2002
Lower Court Opinion: 549 S.E.2d 203 (N.C. 2001)
Question Presented:

(Paraphrase) Whether a statute allowing a jury to consider general benefits -- which include increases in land value that arise from the project that justified the taking and that result from enjoyment of the new facilities and from increased general prosperity resulting from such enjoyment -- when it calculates just compensation for a taking violates the Takings or Equal Protection Clauses.

 

Wilkinson v. Dallas Forth Worth International Airport Board, et al., S. Ct. No. 01-735
Filed: Nov. 21, 2001
Cert. Denied: Feb. 19, 2002

Lower Court Decision: 54 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001).
Questions Presented:

1. Whether Texas, by upholding the actions of the Court of Appeals, has rendered its own constitutional provisions relating to takings to be in violation of the provisions of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by allowing the expansion of the notion of “community” damages in this case. By doing so, they have fostered the use of “community” damages as a subterfuge for immunity which has been made improper under previous rulings of this Court and also in violation of recent decisions of this Court with regards to the standards for partial takings. A “community damage” standard has been created which allows the system to make some pay for a benefit to be enjoyed by all and the community standard has been subverted to be one in which it is impossible for any large number of people to be legally harmed simply because they are a large number. Furthermore, this decision specifically upsets existing law with regards to navigation easements by wrapping them under the community exemptions – clearly in violation of existing law.

2. The actions of the Texas Court have been incompatible to recent actions of this Court as well as established law in that they have found that all takings, contrary to the plain language of their own constitutional provisions, must be total to rise to a constitutional wrong and also providing that the “community” blanket will prevent any sort of analysis for diminutions in value (even if serious) if they are characterized as a generalized taking rather than specific which rulings are in violation of this Court’s recent pronouncements.

* * * [Question 3 omitted.]

Section 28 Partnership, Ltd. v. Martin County, Florida, S. Ct. No. 01-713
Filed: Nov. 19, 2001
Cert. Denied: Jan. 22, 2002

Lower Court Decisions  772 So.2d 616 (Fla. Ct. App. 2000); 794 So.2d 606 (Fla. 2001).
Questions Presented:

1. Whether there is a “substantially advances a legitimate public interest” prong to the takings analysis under the Fifth Amendment which applies to exercises of the police power in regard to individual properties and particular development proposals which do not involve exactions?

* * * [Question 2 omitted.]


Grogan v. City of Cincinnati
, S. Ct. No. 01-828
Filed: Oct. 23, 2001
Cert. Denied: Jan. 7, 2002

Lower Court Decisions: 753 N.E.2d 256 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001); 751 N.E.2d 481 (Ohio 2001).
Questions Presented:

1. Does Ohio Revise Code § 3767.06(A), which permits the closure and pad-locking of property found to be a public nuisance, violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution when applied to close and padlock a commercial establishment located in a high crime area which is open to the public, where the owner of the establishment has taken reasonable steps to abate the behavior which forms the basis of the alleged nuisance, has not acquiesced thereto, yet proves unsuccessful in completely eradicating such behavior?

* * * [Questions 2 & 3 omitted.]


MC Associates v. Town of Cape Elizabeth
, S. Ct. No. 01-655
Filed: Oct. 19, 2001
Cert. Denied: Jan. 7, 2002
Lower Court Decision: 773 A.2d 439 (Me. 2001)
Questions Presented:

1. Can the owner of a residential building lot (a lot of record since 1964) be barred from building a single family house on that lot, and from constitutionally challenging that bar, merely because the present form of his legal ownership of that lot arises after the passage of local land use ordinances that prevent development of the property?

2. Does a diminution in value of a single family house lot from $88,000 (if buildable) to $3,000 (if unbuildable) constitute a categorical taking, notwithstanding the fact that the residual value of the unbuildable lot is greater than zero?

3. In settings where a categorical takings is not found, may the court dispose of the case on a summary judgment motion (as happened here), or must it then proceed to determine whether a non-categorical taking has occurred under more conventional Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) takings doctrines and analyses?

4. In the face of an unequivocal denial by the Town of the right to build on a residential lot (a denial predicated on Wetlands and Minimum Lot Size provisions in the town's Zoning Ordinance) must the owner of the building lot nonetheless pursue to finality (actually obtain) a State waste discharge permit in order to show compliance with the Town's Sewage Disposal Ordinance and to perfect his taking claim?

State Engineering Ass'n v. George Lightbourn, S. Ct. No. 01-638
Filed: Oct. 16, 2001
Cert. Denied: Jan. 7, 2002
Lower Court Decision: 627 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 2001)
Questions Presented:

1. Whether the assets and earnings of the Wisconsin Retirement System are the "private property" of participants in the Wisconsin clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

2. Whether the judicial abandonment or recasting of well established private property rights, properly voids the Constitutional protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as to the taking of such private property without just compensation and without due process of law.

3. Whether the challenged provisions of 1999 Wisconsin Act 11 take the private property of participants in the Wisconsin Retirement System without just compensation and without due process of law.

4. Whether the challenged provisions of 1999 Wisconsin Act 11 impair the contract between participants and the State of Wisconsin in violation of Article I, §10 of the United States Constitution.


Roedler v. Department of Energy
, S. Ct. No. 01-582
Filed: Oct. 4, 2001
Cert. Denied: Dec. 3, 2001
Lower Court Opinions: 1999 WL 1627346 (D. Minn. 1999); 255 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Question Presented:  

1. Does the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq., trump the taking clause of the Fifth Amendment by implementing a contractual scheme where users of nuclear generated power pay a Congressionally mandated fee, collected by the Utility and paid over to the Governments’ [sic] Nuclear Waste Trust Fund, dedicated removal of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF), where it has been judicially determined that the government has breached its Contract obligations to remove SNF but retains and still collects hundreds of millions of dollars from the fee payers who received nothing in return? The Court’s [sic] below denied fee payers, [sic] prayer for legal and equitable relief dismissing the Complaint under F.R. C. P. 12(b)(6).

[Question 2 omitted.]


Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. et al., v. United States of America, et al.,
S. Ct. No. 01-205

Filed: August 1, 2001
Cert. Denied: Dec. 3, 2001
Lower Court Rulings: 247 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001), 45 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
Questions presented:

1. Whether the Federal Circuit’s abrogation of this Court’s decision in Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988), should be permitted to stand and, contrary to this Court’s decision in Eastern Enterprises, Inc. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998), the District Court deprived of subject matter jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ Fifth Amendment challenges to EPACT and claims for prospective, equitable relief.

2. Whether, contrary to this Court’s precedent and decisions of other circuit courts of appeals, the CRC can render judgment on petitioners’ Takings and Due Process Clause challenges to EPACT and provide an “adequate remedy” under 5 U.S.C. § 704 for their equitable claims, hereby depriving the District court of its subject matter jurisdiction over this case.


R.W. Docks & Slips v. Wisconsin
, S. Ct. No. 01-520
Cert. Denied: November 26, 2001
Lower Court Opinions: 628 N.W.2d 781 (Wis. 2001); 617 N.W.2d 519 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000).
Questions Presented:

1. Is the public trust doctrine a "background principle" of state property law as to always be a complete defense to a regulatory taking claim?

2. Are individual condominium units to be regarded each as the relevant parcel in the "takings fraction," for purposes both of the categorical rule of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council and the balancing test of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York?

Allustiarte, et al. v United States , S. Ct. No. 01-575
Cert. Denied: November 26, 2001
Lower Court Opinions: 46 Fed. Cl. 713 (2000); 256 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Questions Presented:  

The petitioners filed a claim against the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims alleging that certain decisions of various bankruptcy courts in the Ninth Circuit amounted to takings of their property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  

The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction.  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.  The question presented here is:  

Should a decision of a bankruptcy court that results in a devaluation or loss of property to a debtor, a creditor, or a person not a party to the bankruptcy action, but which is proper and routine in the administration of the bankruptcy estate, be considered a taking of property without just compensation for which the property owner may seek compensation in an independent claim in the Court of Federal Claims?


Burgess v. Florida Dept. of Envt'l Protection
, S. Ct. No. 01-477
Cert. Denied: November 26, 2001
Lower Court Opinion: 772 So.2d 540 (2000)
Questions Presented:

1. Whether a property owner who establishes that he has been denied all economically viable use of his land is also required to prove that such denial "interfered with his reasonable, distinct, investment-backed expectation, held at the time he purchased the property."

2. Whether the remaining permissible uses of regulated property are economically viable when they consist of "personal recreational use[s]," i.e., "nature walks and fishing."

Bugryn, et al. v. City of Bristol, S. Ct. No. 01-407
Cert. Denied: November 13, 2001
Lower Ct. Opinions: 776 A.2d 1143 (Conn. 2001) (denying cert.); 774 A.2d 1042 (Conn. Ct. App. 2001)
Question Presented:

     When a municipality exercises its condemnation authority in such a manner as to directly benefit a specific and identifiable private interest, do the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require the application of a heightened standard of review in determining whether the condemnation is being carried out for a valid public use?

Harris County, Texas v. Simi Investment Co., Inc., S. Ct. No. 01-544
Cert. Denied: November 13, 2001
Lower Court Opinions: 13 F. Supp.2d 603 (S.D. Tex. 1998); 236 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 2000).
Question Presented:                    

1. Whether substantive due process claims alleging deprivations of property are subsumed under the Takings Clause.

[Questions 2 & 3 omitted.]

Winters v. Oregon, S. Ct. No. 01-386
Cert. Denied: Oct. 29, 2001
Lower Ct. Opinion: 10 P.3d 961(Ore. Ct. App. 1999).
Question Presented:

As a matter of law, is there a "taking" under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States when the Government, over the objection of the owner, repeatedly physically invades and uses private property to construct a public project on adjacent land, the physical invasion is temporary, and the physical invasion causes no physical damage to that property?

Tilley v. Town of Aberdeen, et al., S. Ct. No. 01-321
Cert. denied: Oct. 29, 2001
Lower Court Rulings: Unreported. 4th Circ. No. 01-1192; M.D.N.C. No. 1:98:CV00896.
Question presented:

        Whether the takings, due process, equal protection, and
         conspiracy claims were prudentially ripe. [Citing 
         Palazzolo.]

Weinberg v. Comcast Cablevision of Philadelphia, L.P., S. Ct. No. 00-1859
Cert. Denied: Oct. 1, 2001
Lower Court Ruling: 759 A.2d 395 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
Questions Presented:
In addition to a due process claim (1.) there are two takings claims: 

2. Whether Pennsylvania’s Tenants’ Right to Cable Television Act is unconstitutional because it effected a taking of Petitioner’s Property without just compensation, by arbitrarily limiting the measure of damages to “loss of value,” thereby creating, by legislative fiat, a fixed, nominal payment of $1 as “just compensation” for the occupation of Petitioner’s property, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

3.  Whether Pennsylvania’s Tenants’ Right to Cable Television Act is unconstitutional because the requirement that Petitioner pay one-half of all expenses and fees for an arbitration proceeding to which he did not consent, in an of itself, constitutes “a taking without just compensation,” in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.


Weir v. City of Springfield, Illinois
, S. Ct. No. 00-1801
Cert. Denied: Oct. 1, 2001
Lower Court Rulings: The orders of the Illinois Supreme Court, Appellate Court, and Sangamon County Circuit Court are unreported.  

Question Presented

The first question presented is whether the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, precludes a municipality from charging the owner of a landlocked parcel of land a fee to use a “private road,” owned by the municipality as part of its municipal street system, for ingress to and egress from the landowner’s residential real estate located outside the boundaries of the municipality.


A
skins v. County of Williamsburg
, S. Ct. No. 00-1915
Cert. Denied: Oct. 1, 2001
Lower Court Rulings:  The opinion of the Court of Appeals is unpublished (Unpublished Opinion No. 2000-UP-552 (S.C. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2000)) and the opinion of the Court of Common Pleas is not reported.
Question Presented: 

Whether the judgments of the South Carolina courts that there had been an implied dedication of real property owned by the Petitioner solely because there had been no objection to use of the property by the public constituted a taking of the Petitioner’s real property for a public use without the compensation required by U.S. Const. amends. V and XIV.  

Phelps Dodge Corp. v. United States, S. Ct. No. 00-1464
Petition Filed: March 19, 2001
Lower Court Rulings: 9 P.3d 1069 (Ariz. 2000); 857 P.2d 1236 (Ariz. 1993).
Question Presented:

Does a sudden, unpredictable and retroactive change in judicial precedent that revokes vested property rights in groundwater constitute a taking of private property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution?

Greenspring Racquet Club Inc., et al. v. Baltimore County, Maryland, S. Ct. No. 00-1227
Petition Filed: Jan. 29, 2001
Docketed: Jan 31, 2001
Lower Court Ruling: (unpublished) 2000 WL 1624496 (4th Cir. Oct. 31, 2000)
Questions Presented:

1. Whether a regulatory takings claim based on a land use ordinance's failure to substantially advance a legitimate state interest is categorically barred whenever the regulation is an "ordinary zoning restriction" limiting height and density and when "statements by local lawmakers set out legitimate reasons" for imposing the height and density restrictions? (App. 12-13, 14).

2. In light of Olech v. Village of Willowbrook, is a land use ordinance creating irrational and wholly arbitrary classifications and motivated by malice, bad faith and retaliatory intent immune from a claim that it violates the equal protection clause?

3. In light of Williamson County Reg. Plan. Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, may federal causes of action be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted notwithstanding litigant's request to stay all proceedings in federal court until the causes of action are "ripened" in state court and litigant's express "reservation" in the state action of all federal claims which may be subsequently pursued?

Cayetano v. Chevron USA, S. Ct. No. 00-1198
Petition Filed: Jan. 24, 2001
Docketed: Jan. 24, 2001
Lower Court Ruling: 224 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir.)
Questions Presented:

1. Does the Takings Clause authorize a court to invalidate state rent control or land use regulatory legislation on its face, without regard to whether it diminishes economic value or use or causes any physical invasion of the plaintiff's property, when the court concludes that the statute does not substantially advance a legislative purpose?

2. Does the facial constitutional validity of state legislation depend on whether a federal court predicts that it will achieve its objective?

Karuk Tribe of Calif. v. United States, S. Ct. No. 00-1012
Petition Filed: Dec. 18, 2000
Docketed: Dec. 20, 2000
Lower Court Ruling: 209 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

Question Presented

1. Whether Indians of reservations established by express statutory authorization, the locations of which were determined by delegation to the Executive, have a compensable interest in reservation property under the Fifth Amendment such that it may not be taken by the government without payment of just compensation.   

Boise Cascade Corp. v. Oregon, S. Ct. No. 00-1238
Petition Filed: Jan. 30, 2001
Docketed: Jan. 30, 2001
Lower Court Ruling: 991 P.2d 563 (Or. App. 1999)
Questions Presented:

1. Whether respondent's regulatory order forcing petitioner to submit to the physical occupation of its timberland by northern spotted owls constituted a physical taking of petitioner's property for which just compensation is due.

2. Whether petitioner's regulatory takings claim, which arose when respondent issued a self-described "Final Order" denying petitioner's application for a timber harvesting permit, was rendered "unripe" merely because petitioner did not seek a completely different kind of permit from a separate federal agency that lacked authority to authorize the harvesting under state law.

McKeithen v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., et al., S. Ct. No. 00-1189
Petition Filed: Jan. 23, 2001
Docketed: Jan. 23, 2001
Lower Court Ruling: 226 F.3d 412 (5th Cir. 2000)
Questions Presented:

1. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with the majority of the Court's opinions in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 141 L.Ed. 2d 451 (1998).
Did the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit improperly interpret the majority of the Court's opinion in Eastern Enterprises to apply the Takings Clause to invalidate the funding mechanism for a vital Louisiana program even though the statute held unconstitutional does not impact an identifiable property interest or fund?

2. There is a split in the United States Courts of Appeal as to whether Eastern Enterprises supports invalidating a statute other than the Coal Act.  The United States Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Third, and Fourth Circuits have refused to extend the Takings Clause analysis of Eastern Enterprises beyond the Coal Act, and then only to parties in a substantially identical position to Eastern Enterprises with respect to both the plurality and Justice Kennedy's concurrence. Is the Takings Clause analysis of Eastern Enterprises properly applied to a non-Coal Act statute that only imposes a general financial assessment against a company without identifying a particular property interest or fund?

3. Is it proper for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to grant summary judgment invalidating the funding mechanism for a vital Louisiana program on the basis that it violates the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution even though the Insurers failed to carry their substantial burden of proof in that they failed to present any evidence to support essential elements of their claim?

B&G Enterprises v. United States, S. Ct. No. 00-709
Petition Filed: Nov. 2, 2000
Docketed: Nov. 2, 2000
Denied: Feb. 20, 2001
Lower Court Rulings: 220 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2000); 43 Fed. Cl. 523 (1999).
Questions Presented:

Whether block grants authorized by Congress in 42 U.S.C. s 300x-26(a) and implemented by the Department of Health and Human Services and carried out by the states and their subdivisions rendered the action taken by the states attributable to the federal government as a taking of property under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.

a. Whether an affirmative act to compel or coerce action of a state that results in a taking is necessary to attribute the taking to the federal government.

b. Whether the activities of the State of California enforcing a ban on cigarette vending machines, pursuant to a federal block grant program, are attributable to the federal government.

c. Whether a party seeking just compensation from the federal government for state action must prove that the state was acting as the common law agent of the federal government.

Hansen v. Snohomish County, S. Ct. No. 00-989
Petition Filed: Oct. 10, 2000
Docketed: Dec. 18, 2000
Lower Court Ruling: 97 Wash. App. 1083 (1999), cert. denied, 10 P.3d 403 (2000) (table).

Questions Presented

1. Whether a regulatory takings claim based on denial of all “economically viable use” (Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)) may be dismissed as a matter of law by merely showing that there has not been a total deprivation of value? 

2. When regulations allow constructing a house on a parcel, is that use a per se “economically viable use” so that a takings claim may be dismissed as a matter of law even though undisputed expert testimony concludes that residential construction is not economically reasonable or viable for a builder or the land owner? 

3. Where current government land use restrictions require that 96% of a four acre parcel be left in its natural state to serve as a public drainage/water detention basin for a 250 acre upland area (owned by others), is there a taking of the 96% portion that is required to be left economically idle? 

4. Does the “ripeness” doctrine require dismissal of a regulatory takings claim where a land owner has not sought a permit for a particular use that is not economically viable? 

Virgin v. County of San Luis Obispo, S. Ct. No. 00-960
Petition Filed: Dec. 12, 2000
Docketed: Dec. 12, 2000
Lower Court Opinions:  from the Cal. Ct. App. and the cert. denial from the S. Ct. are unreported.

Question Presented

1. Is due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States denied when state courts summarily dismiss concurrent jurisdiction federal constitutional clams against local governments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for takings, equal protection, and substantive and procedural due process violations, under a standard of review that “expressly required” that the state court (a) “look only to the evidence supporting” the governmental action, (b) discard “evidence unfavorable” to the government, (c) accept only those inferences from the evidence as drawn by the government, and (d) disregard “even uncontradicted evidence”? 

Barrett v. Borough of Carlisle, S. Ct. No. 00-977
Petition Filed: Dec. 11, 2000
Docketed: Dec. 15, 2000
Lower Court Opinions: from the 3rd Cir. and the federal district court, M.D. Pa., are unreported. 

Note: The petitioner is pro se. The petitioner alleges that the local historic district was never properly certified and that landowners were denied due process during the certification process, and that absent certification, the historic district regulations and denial of building permits constitutes a taking. The petitioner argues that the District Court misread Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City to mean that historical designation is never a takings and should not have dismissed his claim due to res judicata
Questions Presented

1. Whether property owners were deprived of rights to due process in alleged proceedings before the historic certification authority, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983? 

2. Whether property owners were deprived of rights to just compensation for the regulation of their property, absent Constitutionally valid historic certification, in violation of  42 U.S.C. § 1983? 

3. Whether Petitioner established excusable neglect or good cause for extending the time for filing a notice of appeal under 42 U.S.C. § 2107(c)? 

4. Whether the Appellate Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal?

New Pulaski Co., L.P. v. Mayor and City of Baltimore,  S. Ct. 00-759
Lower Court Ruling: 217 F.3d 840 (4th Cir. July 20, 2000) in Table of Decisions without Reported Opinions.
Text of unpublished disposition at 2000 WL 1005207.
Petition Filed: November 13, 2000

Question Presented

            1. In the finality requirement for the ripeness of a
            constitutional claim inapplicable where the available
            variance or exemption process requires a decision by a
            “legislative/political” body?  

Stevens Creek Quarry, Inc. v. Santa Clara County Planning Commission, S. Ct. 00-491
Lower Court Rulings:  unreported.
Petition Filed: September 25, 2000
Question Presented:

Was it error to convert the plaintiff's substantive due process claim, which alleged the violation of a non-property-based fundamental right, into a takings claim?

Louisiana v. Avenal, S. Ct. 00-456
Lower Court Rulings: 2000 WL 320460 (La. Ct. App. March 5, 2000) rehearing of 757 So. 2d 1 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
Petition Filed: September 20, 2000
Questions Presented:

Whether a State court's refusal to apply or even recognize the preclusive effect of a Federal court's finding of fact related to an identical issue of whether a "taking" occurred constitutes a violation of the "Full Faith and Credit Clause," the "Supremacy Clause" of the United States Constitution and/or the federal "Full Faith and Credit" statute.

Westside Quik Shop, Inc. v. Stewart, S. Ct. 00-433
Lower Court Ruling: WL 823346 (S.C. June 21, 2000).
Petition Filed: September 19, 2000
Questions Presented:

Whether a State Legislature may, by statute, designate a class of property, the ownership and use of which has been legal within the State for decades and where the State has taken specific action to require expenditures and investments to maintain that property, as illegal "contraband" and thereby avoid the constitutional duty to pay just compensation for the taking of such property even though this Court held in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980)), that a "'State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without compensation'"?

Whether the court below erred in holding that reasonable investment-backed expectations are part of every takings case, even those cases in which the property owner has shown that he has been deprived of all economically beneficial use of his property?

Kinross Copper Corp. v. Oregon, S. Ct. 00-431
Lower Court Ruling: 988 P.2d 400 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) 
affirming prior Ct. of Appeals decision, 981 P.2d 833 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).
Petition Filed: September 18, 2000
Questions Presented:

When an unpatented mining right protected by federal law is abrogated by a state regulation prohibiting discharge of nonpolluting mine waters, does a taking occur under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause?

Is a state regulation that prohibits the discharge of nonpolluting mine waters, and thus prevents an unpatented mining claim on federal lands from being developed, preempted by federal law?

Does takings jurisprudence require a property owner to show that it has a property interest in the very thing the state seeks to regulate, rather than merely showing that the effect of the regulation as applied to the petitioner denies it all economic use of a federally recognized property right?

Can a state court, under the guise of stating that the holder of an unpatented mining claim never had the right to appropriate water for the mine and, therefore, never had the right to discharge it as a part of its property right, thus avoid a "taking," when at commonlaw it was not a nuisance for a miner to discharge nonpolluting mine waters into streams?

Advance Leasing and Development v. Hart (Hillsborough County), S. Ct. 00-348
Petition Filed: Sept. 1, 2000

Questions Presented:

Whether the Eleventh Circuit's after-the-fact, hypothetical consideration of any conceivable justification for a local government's zoning denial, at summary judgment without trial by jury, conflicts with this Court's requirements of a jury trial to examine the reasonableness of the local government's proffered justifications, as established by City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 119 S. Ct. 1624 (1999) ("Del Monte Dunes").

Whether the Eleventh Circuit's refusal to recognize a due process takings claim is in direct conflict with this Court's decision in Del Monte Dunes which expressly holds that a due process takings claim is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Dunn v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, S. Ct. 00-341
Petition Filed: Aug. 30, 2000
Lower Court Rulings: Dunn v. Executive Office of Envtl. Affairs, 725 N.E.2d 1087 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (table), petition for cert. denied, 733 N.E.2d 1065 (Mass. 2000) (table).
Questions Presented:

Whether the principle of reasonable investment backed expectations should apply to the Petitioners, who acquired their property by inheritance.

Whether the Petitioners can be deprived of a trial by jury in a claim made under the State Declaratory Judgment Act.

Whether the Petitioners can be denied just compensation, when the proposed use of their property would not create a public nuisance.

Troy v. Pierce County, S. Ct. 00-163
Petition filed: July 31, 2000
Lower court ruling: 1999 WL 780997 (Wash. App. Div. 2)
Questions Presented:

In this case the government desires to permanently preserve areas of land in a natural, undisturbed state, and a County ordinance accomplishes this by requiring owners of the selected land, as a building permit condition, to "protect" the selected area by deeding a tract, easement, or land dedication to "the County" or "the public", and, by having county signs installed every 30 feet to mark the boundaries of the preserved tract.

Where the owner's proposed construction does not create the need for a land preserve, is just compensation required under the U.S. Constitution's Fifth Amendment (applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment) for the property conveyance and/or for the physical occupation of the signs?

In acquiring the above tract, where the County provides no hearing, nor any process for getting compensation, and requires the conveyance to be made by recording a plat of subdivision that violates plat statutes (a gross misdemeanor), is there just cause for damages for denial of due process under the U.S. Constitution's Fifth Amendment and/or for deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?

Since the above ordinance is applied at development time, when it is common to have the land as subject or collateral in financing contracts, is the County's appropriation of a property interest without any consideration of existing contract interests or obligations, in violation of Article 1 § 10 [1] of the U.S. Constitution: "No State shall * * * pass any * * * Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts * * *"?

Chevy Chase Land Co. of Montgomery County, Md. v. United States, S. Ct. No. 00-31
Petition filed: July 3, 2000
Lower court ruling: 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS (Fed.Cir.)
Questions Presented:

May a court re-define a property interest, using new legal principles, to reject a constitutional takings claim.

Where petitioner originally conveyed only a right of way easement to a railroad, was the property of the petitioner taken when the government appropriated the property for a recreational trail and/or other uses not intended when the easement was conveyed.

Where the railroad to whom petitioner conveyed a right of way easement abandoned that easement, was the property of the petitioner taken when the government thereafter appropriated the property for its own use.

City of Los Angeles v. Ali, S. Ct. No. 99-2084
Petition filed: June 27, 2000
Lower court ruling: 77 Cal. App. 4th (1999)
Questions Presented:

Whether the California Court of Appeals erred in holding that a city requirement that a landowner complete a land use development approval process by itself constitutes a compensable "temporary" regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment.

Whether the California Court of Appeals erred by holding that a land-use regulation that violates state law effects a temporary taking of property on that basis alone.

Saboff v. St. Johns River Water Management Dist., S. Ct. No. 99-2011
Petition filed: June 15, 2000
Lower court ruling: 200 F.3d 1356 (11th Cir. 2000)
Questions Presented:

If the State denies compensation to a landowner, under state law, are the state court proceedings res judicata to a Fifth Amendment taking claim under section 1983.

Must a landowner reserve a Fifth Amendment taking claim for subsequent litigation in federal court if the Fifth Amendment taking claim does not accrue until after exhaustion of state court remedies.

If a Fifth Amendment taking claim does not accrue until a landowner has been denied an adequate post-deprivation remedy in the state court, thus creating a separate Fifth Amendment constitutional cause of action, is a formal written reservation under Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Authority, 953 F. 2d 1299 (11th Cir. 1992) and Jennings v. Caddo Parrish School Board, 531 F. 2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 897, 97 S. Ct. 260, 50 L. Ed. 2d 180 (1976), necessary to preserve the right to proceed in federal court after the state court has denied relief under state law.

Miami-Dade County v. Agripost, Inc., S. Ct. No. 99-1856
Petition Filed: May 18, 2000
Lower court ruling: 195 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 1999)
Questions Presented:

Does the Eleventh Circuit's exception to this Court's rule against reversing state court judgments prevent state courts from deciding whether regulatory actions should be reversed as confiscatory in order to avoid permanent takings such as the claimed $140,000,000 taking in question.

If a federal court lacks jurisdiction over a federal regulatory taking claim because it is unripe, does the court nevertheless have jurisdiction to adjudicate preclusion defenses.

By holding that a state takings claim was neither before the court nor germane, did the Eleventh Circuit deprive the County of its right to appeal the district court's exercise of jurisdiction over, and its disposition of, the County's defenses to that claim.

District Intown Properties Ltd. Partnership v. District of Columbia, S. Ct. No. 99-1666
Petition filed: April 17, 2000
Lower court ruling: 198 F.3d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
Questions Presented:

When analyzing a governmental regulation of property for Takings Clause purposes, how should courts determine the relevant unit of property in a case where a landowner owns several geographically contiguous parcels, only some of which are burdened by the regulation.

Does a governmental regulation of property that requires a landowner to leave eight contiguous lots in a completely undeveloped state as a grass lawn deny "all economically beneficial and productive use of land" within the meaning of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).

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